Oleum Gas Leakage Case
M.C. Mehta And Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 20 December, 1986
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Oleum Gas Leakage Case |
The Constitution of India 1950
Articles 12 & 21 - Private corporation - Engaged in industry vital to public interest with potential to affect life and health of people--Whether 'other authority'--Extent of availability of Article 21.
Article 32 - Jurisdiction and Power of Court--Not only injunctive in ambit--Remedial in scope and provides relief for infringement of fundamental right--Power to award com- pensation. Public Interest Litigation--Maintainability of--Whether letters addressed even to an individual judge entertainable--Whether preferred form of address applicable--Whether letters to be supported by affidavits--Hyper-technical approach to be avoided by the Court--Court must look at the substance and not the form--Court's power to collect relevant material and to appoint commissions. Law of Torts--Liability of an enterprise engaged in a hazardous and inherently dangerous industry for occurrence of accident--Strict and absolute--Quantum of compensation payable for harm caused--Determination of--Rule laid in Rylands v. Fletcher--Whether applicable in India.
Jurisprudence Law should keep pace with changing socioeconomic norms. Where a law of the past does not fit in to the present context, Court should evolve new law.
Interpretation of Constitution - Creative and innovative interpretation in consonance with human rights jurisprudence emphasised. Interpretation of statutes - Foreign case law & Supreme Court of India not bound to follow.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioners, in this writ petition under Art. 32, sought a direction for closure of the various units of Shriram Foods & Fertilizers 820 Industries on the ground that they were hazardous to the community. During the pendency of the petition, there was escape of oleum gas from one of the units of Shriram. The Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board and the Delhi Bar Associa- tion filed applications for award of compensation to the persons who had suffered harm on account of escape of oleum gas. A Bench of three Hon'ble Judges while permitting Shriram to restart its power plant as also other plants subject to certain conditions, referred the applications for compensa- tion to a larger Bench of five Judges because issues of great constitutional importance were involved, namely,
(1) What is the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 32 since the applications for compensation are sought to be maintained under that Article;
(2) Whether Art. 21 is available against Shriram which is owned by Delhi Cloth Mills Limited, a public company limited by shares and which is engaged in an industry vital to public interest and with potential to affect the life and health of the people; and
(3) What is the measure of liabil- ity of an enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an accident occurring in such industry, persons die or are injured. Does the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1866 Law Report 1 Excheq- uer 265) apply or is there any other principle on which the liability can be determined. Disposing of the applications, HELD:
1. The question whether a private corporation like Shriram would fall within the scope and ambit of Art. 12 so as to be amenable to the discipline of Art. 21 is left for proper and detailed consideration at a later stage if it becomes necessary to do so. [844F-G] Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, [1967] 3 SCR 377; Sukhdev v. Bhagwat Ram, [1975] 1 SCC 421; Ramanna Shetty v. International Airport Authority, [1979] 3 SCR 1014;
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, [1981] 2 SCR 79; \
Som Prakash v. Union of India, [1981] 1 S.C.C. 449;
Appendix I to Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948;
Industries (Develop- ment and Regulation) Act, 1951;
Delhi Municipal Act, 1957
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974;
Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981;
Eurasian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCR 674;
Rasbehari Panda v. St.ate, [1969] 3 SCR 374;
Kas- turi Lal Reddy v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, [1980] 3 SCR 1338, referred to. 821
2. The Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board is directed to take up the cases of all those who claim to have suffered on account of oleum gas and to file actions on their behalf in the appropriate Court for claiming compensation and the Delhi Administration is directed to provide necessary funds to the Board for the purpose. [844G-H; 845A]
3.(i) Where there is a violation of a fundamental or other legal right of a person or class of persons who by reason of poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position cannot approach a Court of law for justice, it would be open to any public-spirited individual or social action group to bring an action for vindication of the fundamental or other legal right of such individual or class of individuals and this can be done not only by filing regular writ petition under Art. 226 in the High Court and under Art. 32 in this Court, but also by addressing a letter to the Court. [828B-C; E-F]
3.(ii) Even if a letter is addressed to an individual Judge of the Court, it should be entertained, provided of course it is by or on behalf of a person in custody or on behalf of a woman or a child or a class or deprived or disadvantaged persons. [829B-C]
3.(iii) Letters addressed to individual Justices of this Court should not be rejected merely because they fail to conform to the preferred form of address nor should the Court adopt a rigid stance that no letters will be enter- tained unless they are supported by an affidavit. If the Court were to insist on an affidavit as a condition of entertaining the letters the entire object and purpose of epistolary jurisdiction would be frustrated because most of the poor and disadvantaged persons will then not be able to have easy access to the Court and even the social action groups will find it difficult to approach the Court.
[828H; 829B] Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Ors., [1984] 2 SCR 67;
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, [1981] (Suppl) SCC 87 and
Union for Democratic Rights & Ors. v. Union of India, [1983] 1 SCR 456, relied upon.
4.(i) Article 32 does not merely confer power on this Court to issue direction, order or writ for enforcement of the fundamental rights but it also lays a constitutional obligation on this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people and for that purpose this Court has all inci- dental and ancillary powers including the power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce the fundamental rights. It is in realisation of this constitu- tional obligation that this Court 822 has, in the past, innovated new methods and strategies for the purpose of securing enforcement of the fundamental rights, particularly in the case of the poor and the disad- vantaged who are denied their basic human rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. [827F-828A]
4.(ii) The power of the Court is not only injunctive in ambit, that is, preventing the infringement of fundamental right but it is also remedial in scope and provides relief against a breach of the fundamental right already committed. [830A-B]
4(iii) The power of the Court to grant such remedial relief may include the power to award compensation in appro- priate cases. The infringement of the fundamental right must be gross and patent, that is incontrovertible and exfacie glaring and either such infringement should be on a large scale affecting the fundamental rights of a large number of persons or it should appear unjust or unduly harsh or op- pressing on account of their poverty or disability or so- cially or economically disadvantaged position to require the person or persons affected by such infringement to initiate and pursue action in the Civil Courts. [830D; E-F]
4. (iv) Ordinarily a petition under Art. 32 should not be used as a substitute for enforcement of the right to claim compensation for infringement of a fundamental right through the ordinary process of Civil Court. It is only in exceptional cases that compensation may be awarded in a petition under Art. 32. [830F-G]
4.(v) The applications for compensation in the instant writ petition are for enforcement of the fundamental right to life enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution and while dealing with such applications the Court cannot adopt a hyper-technical approach which would defeat the ends of justice. The Court must look at the substance and not the form. Therefore, the instant applications for compensation are maintainable under Art. 32.
[827A-B] Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Ors., [1984] 2 SCR 67;
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, [1981] (Suppl.) SCR 87;
Union for Democratic Rights & Ors. v. Union of India, [1983] 1 SCR 456 and
Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1086, relied upon.
5. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) laid down a principle of liability that if a person who brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does 823 damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. This rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is statutory author- ity. This rule evolved in the 19th century at a time when all these developments of science and technology had not taken place cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social structure. In a modern industrial society with highly de- veloped scientific knowledge and technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to carry on as part of developmental programme, the Court need not feel inhibited by this rule merely because the new law does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability in case of an enterprise engaged in hazardous and dangerous activi- ty. [842D-G] Halsburry Laws of England, Vol. 45 Para 1305, relied upon.
6. (i) Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. Law cannot afford to remain static. The Court cannot allow judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or in any other foreign country. Although this Court should be prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes, but it has to build up its own jurisprudence, evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly indus- trialised economy. If it is found that it is necessary to construct a new principle of law to deal with -an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concommitant to an industrial economy the Court should not hesitate to evolve such principles of liability merely because it has not been so done in England. [843A-E]
(ii) This Court has throughout the last few years expanded the horizon of Art. 12 primarily to inject respect for human-rights and social conscience in corporate struc- ture. The purpose of expansion has not been to destroy the raison d'etre of creating corporations but to advance the human rights jurisprudence. The apprehension that including within the ambit of Art. 12 and thus subjecting to the discipline of Art. 21 those private corporations whose activities have the potential of affecting the life and health of the people, would deal a death blow to 824 the policy of encouraging and permitting private enterpre- neurial activity is not well founded. It is through creative interpretation and bold innovation that the human-rights jurisprudence has been developed in India to a remarkable extent and this forward march of the humanrights movement cannot be allowed to be halted by unfounded apprehensions expressed by status quoists. [841C-E]
7.(i) An enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an abso- lute non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that if any harm results to anyone, the enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm irrespective of the fact that the enterprise had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part. [843E-G]
7.(ii) If the enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such activity as an appropriate item of its overheads. The enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards. [844A-B]
7.(iii) The measure of compensation in such kind of cases must be co-related to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deter- rent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise. [844E-F]
8. The historical context in which the American doctrine of State action evolved in the united States is irrelevant for the purpose of Indian Courts, especially in view of Art. 15(2) of the Indian Constitution. But, it is the principle behind the doctrine of State aid, control and regulation so impregnating a private activity as to give it the colour of State action which can be applied to the limited extent to which it can be Indianised and harmoniously blended with Indian constitutional 825 jurisprudence. Indian Courts are not bound by the American exposition of constitutional law. The provisions of American Constitution cannot always be applied to Indian conditions or to the provisions of Indian Constitution and whilst some of the principles adumberated by the American decisions may provide a useful guide, close adherence to those principles while applying them to the provisions of the Indian Consti- tution is not to be favoured, because the social conditions in India are different. [840D-H] Ramanna Shetty v. International Airport Authority,
[1979] 3 SCR 1014; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 42 L.ed. (2d) 477;
Air India v. Nargesh Mirza, [1982] 1 SCR 438 and
General Electric Co. Maratha v. Gilbert, 50 L.ed (2d) 343, relied upon.
