Appropriate Government under Industrial Dispute Act 1947


Appropriate Government under Industrial Dispute Act 1947


The government plays a vital role in the working of industrial adjudication system in India. In addition to enacting the laws for regulating specific conditions of service, the state intervenes directly in the process of settlement of industrial disputes through, mainly, conciliation and adjudication. The intervention of the Government in the process of compulsory adjudication is all-pervasive. Except the actual adjudication, every other incidental function necessary for the adjudication of industrial disputes is to be performed by the Government. From the initial function of constituting the adjudicatory mechanisms and referring disputes to them for adjudication, up to the ultimate function of ensuring the implementation of the awards of these authorities are entrusted to the appropriate government under the scheme of adjudication provided by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

In other words, the appropriate Government is involved in every matter of detail in the scheme of adjudication. The rationale for this is that it is the responsibility of the appropriate government to ensure industrial peace that is essential for maintaining an uninterrupted production, supply and distribution of goods and services within its territorial jurisdiction and therefore, it has to play a major and active role in the settlement of industrial disputes.

The main purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is to ensure fair terms between employers and employees, workmen and workmen as well as workmen and employers.. The objective of the Industrial Disputes Act is to secure industrial peace and harmony by providing machinery and procedure for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes by negotiations.

Sec.2 (a) of I.D.Act defines the term “appropriate Government” to include both the Central and State Governments and lays down their respective dominions in relation to industrial disputes. The Constitution of India 195021 also envisage jurisdiction of both the Central and State Governments on all matters of labour and industrial disputes in respect of both legislative and executive powers(Ram Jawaya v. State ofPunjab, AIR 1955 S.C. 549). Further, the I.D.Act directs that the functions of the government under the act shall be discharged both by the Central Government and the State Governments.

Broadly, Central Government is declared to be the appropriate Governments “in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government,” some specified Central Statutory Corporations, a Banking or an Insurance company, a mine, an oil field, a cantonment board or a major port. And in relation to any other industrial dispute, the State Government is the appropriate Government.

If the Government referring a dispute for adjudication is not the appropriate Government, within the meaning of this definition, the Tribunal to which the dispute is referred would not get jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute and even if an award is rendered, it would be a nullity. Therefore, the parties in certain cases exploited this legal position by challenging the awards on the ground that the Government that referred the dispute for adjudication was not the appropriate Government. The phrase ‘any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government’, occurring in the first part of the definition, has been construed by the Supreme court as including only the industries which are carried on by the Central Government directly, such as Railways, Postal and Telegraphs, Telephones, etc., and those carried on “under the authority of ” i.e., as an agent or servant of the Central Government (Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State ofBihar (1969)11 L. L. J. 549 (S.C.); Hindustan Aeronautics Limit Ltd v. Their Workmen, (1975) IIL. L. J. 336 (S.C.)).

According to this interpretation, no industry carried on by a private person or a limited company can be an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government even when it is so carried on under a license granted or under a trust created by the Central Governmen (Carlsbud Mineral Water Mafg Co. Ltd. v. P.K. Sarkar, (1952) l.L.L.J. 488 (Cal); Indian Naval Canteen Control Board v. Industrial Tribunal, (1965) II L.L.J. 366 (Ker)). Further the industries, which are carried on by incorporated commercial companies, viz., Central Public Sector Industries, which are governed by their own constitutions, cannot be considered as industries carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. Therefore, the Central Government companies or corporations, which are not specified in the first part of the definition, do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Central Government. The Supreme court held that since these Government companies are independent legal entities and run the industries for their own purposes under their own constitutions, they cannot be brought within the meaning of the phrase “industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government”. Even in case of industries in which the Central Government owns the entire share capital and thus exercises full control, it was held that they cannot be said to be industries carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. The Courts refused to lift the corporate veil for this purpose.

The question whether a corporation is an agent of state, it was held, must depend upon the facts of each case. Further even if a Central Government company or a corporation is “State” for the purposes of Art. of the Constitution on the ground that it is state’s agent or instrumentality, it still may not be an “industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government” (Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. The Government of Tamilnadu, (1985) IIL L. J. 509 (Mad).

The second part of the definition, which declares that the State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to all other industrial disputes, also gave scope for much of litigation in case of industrial concerns having establishments in more than one state. The Courts have generally relied upon the principles governing the
jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain actions or proceedings. In particular, the principle of the cause of action has been pressed into service. In Lalbhai Tricumlal
Mills Ltd v. D.M. Vin1 Chagla C.J. observed:

“Applying the well known principles of jurisdiction, a court or tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within its jurisdiction or if the subject matter of the dispute substantially arises within its jurisdiction. And, therefore, the correct approach to the question is to ask ourselves - where did the dispute substantially arise?

In Indian Cable Company Ltd v. Its workme the Supreme Court echoing the voice of the Chagla C.J., observed that as the Act contained no provision bearing on this question, it must consequently be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of courts to entertain actions or proceedings. The court extracted the above quoted passage from Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills case and held that “these principles are applicable for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under section 10 of the Act”.

The principle established in the above two cases was followed by the Supreme Court in Workmen of Sri Rangavilas Motors (P) Ltd v. Sri. Rangavilas Motors (P) Ltd,10 and later in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd v. Their Workmen,n In Sri Rangavilas Motors case the Court laid down a test “ Where did the dispute arise?. Ordinarily, if there is a separate establishment, and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place... there would clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the state and not necessarily between the territory of the state and the industry concerning which the dispute arose.”

But doubts still persist on the question, whether the existence of a separate branch or establishment in State other than the State in which the head quarters of the industry is situate, is necessary to consider the former as the appropriate Government with respect to disputes concerning the workmen employed in that State. In other words, for the application ofthe above principle, whether “ the existence of a separate branch” is part of the ratio of the above two Supreme Court decisions? In Association ofMedical Representatives v. Industrial Tribunal, the M.P. High Court held that in respect of a dispute relating to a workman employed in the State of M.P., where there is no separate establishment of the company, the appropriate Government was the State of Maharastra in which the head quarters are situated. But in Paritosh Kumar Pal v. State of Bihar, a Full Bench of the Patna High Court considered that the existence of a separate establishment is not a necessary part of the ratio and therefore, in respect of a dispute relating to a workman employed in Bihar, where there was no separate establishment of the company, the appropriate Government was the State of Bihar and not the State of West Bengal, in whose territories the head quarters of the company is situated'.

This confusion is further confounded by a new principle’ enunciated by some High Courts, according to which there can be two appropriate Governments for the same dispute and a reference by either of them can be valid. Although most of them are obiter observations, the Delhi High Court in Gestetner Duplicators (P) Ltd. v. D.D. Gupta} had specifically taken this view and applied this principle to the facts in this ease by validating reference made by the Delhi Administration, where the appropriate Government was, as per the principle enunciated earlier by the Supreme Court, the Karnataka State Government. The pragmatic approach of these courts deserves to be appreciated. But a separate line of cases exist where some other High Courts had entirely rejected this theory of two appropriate Governments on purely technical and legalistic considerations. It is really painful that after a sufficiently long time was spent on the adjudication of the dispute and an ward was rendered, the courts quash the award on such jurisdictional grounds because the Government which initially referred the dispute for adjudication was not the appropriate Government in the opinion of those courts. Until the definition is suitably amended to provide for such situations, it is better that the principle of simultaneous jurisdiction of two appropriate Governments is recognized, so that awards made by the Tribunals shall not be quashed on such technical grounds, although many may strongly oppose this view'

The situation that exists now is such that in certain border line cases a Government itself might not be sure whether it is the appropriate Government in respect of such a dispute.

Sec. 2(a) – Appropriate Government




(i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government] or 

in relation to an industrial dispute concerning [ a Dock Labour Board established under section 5A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1940 ), or 

the Industrial Finance Corporation of India established under section 3 of the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 (15 of 1948 ), or 

the Employees' State Insurance Corporation established under section 3 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948 ), or 

the Board of Trustees constituted under section 3A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of 1948 ), or 

the Central Board of Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted under section 5A and section 5B, respectively, of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952 ), or the" Indian Airlines" and" Air India" Corporations established under section 3 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953 ), or 

the Life Insurance Corporation of India established under section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956 ), or 

the Oil and Natural Gas Commission established under section 3 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 (43 of 1959 ), or 

the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation established under section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961 ), or the Central Warehousing Corporation established under section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 (58 of 1962 ), or 

the Unit Trust of India established under section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963 ), or 

the Food Corporation of India established under section 3, or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States under section 16, of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964 ), or

the International Airports Authority of India constituted under section 3 of the International Airports Authority of India Act, 1971 (48 of 1971 ), or 

a Regional Rural Bank established under section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976 ), or the Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation Limited or

the Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India 2 [ the National Housing Bank established under section 3 of the National Housing Bnak Act, 1987 (53 of 1987 ) or]

a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oil- field] 4 , a Cantonment Board,] or a major port, the Central Government, and 

(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, the State Government;

1- For Hospital

The Appropriate Government to Tata Memorial Hospital is State Government for the reason that the property of the Hospital rests with the governing council of the society and further the control and management of the Hospital and research centre is exercised independently by the said governing council of the society. This is despite the fact that the Central Government has the power to appoint four nominees on the governing council because mere power to appoint directors does not warrant a conclusion that the hospital is a Central Government establishment. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of the Division Bench which had held that the Appropriate Government is Central Government to the Tata Memorial Centre.

Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union v. Tata Memorial Centre & Anr., 2010

How is the property of the first respondent vested.

As can be seen from the facts, which have come on record, the Tata Memorial Hospital was set up by Sir Dorabji Tata Trust. It was being maintained out of the funds of the Trust itself as well as from the grants made over by the Central Government as well as by the State Government. The Indian Cancer Research Centre was set up by the joint collaboration of Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and the Central Government by an agreement dated 07.10.1953. The initial grant for the Center was given by the Central Government and it was meeting the expenses of the Centre though it was set up on the land belonging to the Trust. In 1957 Sir Dorabji Tata Trust decided to dedicate to the nation the property on which the Tata Memorial Centre stands. An agreement was entered in that year between the trustees and the Central Government. The control and the management of the hospital was transferred to the Central Government and a vesting order was passed in the same year to that effect by the City Civil Court in appropriate proceedings. In the year 1966, the Central Government and the Dorabji Tata Trust entered into an agreement by virtue of which Tata Memorial Hospital and the Indian Cancer Research Centre were amalgamated and the first respondent society was created and the administration and the management of the Centre was vested in the Governing Council of the said Society. The first respondent - Centre was registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as well as under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950.”

“It has clearly come in the evidence of Mr. Muthusamy, the Chief Administrative Officer of the first respondent that there was no interference of the Central Government in the day to day activities of the first respondent. The decisions were taken by the directors of the first respondent itself. As can be seen from the bye-laws of the first respondent, the appointments and the service conditions were modelled on the pattern of Department of Atomic Energy, but the pay, allowances and pension, etc. are on the pattern of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, and which are fixed by the decisions of the Governing Council of the first respondent. The material and the evidence as referred to above clearly show that the entrustment of the management and control of the Hospital and the Research Centre to the Society was complete and it has been so functioning thereafter.”

“Hence we have to conclude that even on the test of control and management of the Hospital and the Centre, they are functioning independently under the 1st respondent Society. They cannot be said to be under the control of the Central Government. In the circumstances the State Government shall have to be held as the appropriate government for the 1st respondent for the purpose of I.D. Act consequently the MRTU & PULP Act.”

2 For Air transport service

The Central Government by notification prohibited employment of contract labour of trolley retrievals in the establishment of the Airport Authority of India at the Indira Gandhi International Airport and Domestic Airport at Delhi. The AAI u/s. 12A of AAI Act transferred/leased statutory public functions of “Air transport service” to Delhi International Airport Pvt Ltd. The issue is whether the notification extends to DIAL which is a private entity and the Appropriate Government to DIAL is Central Government or not. It is held that DIAL derives its authority from AAI and AAI derives its authority from powers given by the Central Government which exercises extensive control over it. Therefore DIAL though private undertaking can function “under the authority” of the Central Government inasmuch as the powers of DIAL in relation to Delhi Airports are traceable to Sec. 12A of AAI Act inasmuch as DIAL has assumed the same obligations through OMDA with powers and functions of AAI. It has simply stepped into the shoes of AAI and therefore Central Government is Appropriate Government qua DIAL and the notification of prohibition is applicable to DIAL, the establishment of AAI being also the establishment of DIAL.

Delhi International Airport Private Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., 2012

“Firstly, the Central Government is the "appropriate government" in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government. Secondly, the Central Government is the "appropriate government" in relation to industrial disputes concerning AAI. Thirdly, the Central Government is the "appropriate government" in relation to industrial disputes concerning an air traffic service. Thus, if DIAL's industry is carried on "under the authority" of the Central Government, if the dispute in question can be said to concern AAI, or the dispute in question can be said to concern an "air transport service", then the Central Government is the "appropriate government" both under ID Act and CLRAA.” (Page: 142, Para: 13)

“In the impugned judgment, the Division Bench correctly held that "the provisions of the AAI Act show that there is extensive control of the Central Government over the functioning of AAI." Section 12A reveals control of the Central Government on AAI. AAI has to obtain approval from the Central Government before delegating any of its functions to third parties, such as DIAL. This clearly indicates that the Central Government has complete control over AAI. Sections 2, 6 and 10 of the AAI are further examples of governmental reservations of authority. The Central Government retains its statutory control over AAI. In the impugned judgment, the High Court correctly came to the conclusion that "the authority of the Central Government is conferred by the statute itself.

In fact, in these cases, we are merely concerned with very limited controversy whether DIAL works under the authority of the Central Government or not? DIAL, of course, claims that it does not.” (Page: 150, Para: 45)

“The undertakings need not be government undertakings to have had authority conferred upon them. But the word "government" clearly modifies "company." However, it cannot modify "undertaking," for the phrase "government/any undertaking". Thus, it would seem that any "undertaking"even private undertakings, like DIAL - may function "under the authority" of the Central Government. Whether or not they do it, as the Constitution Bench noted, "a question of fact which has to be ascertained on the facts and in the circumstances of each case.” (Page: 151, Para: 49)

“In the facts and circumstances of these cases, it is abundantly clear that DIAL operates under the authority of the Central Government

In the impugned judgment, it was noted that "the functions and powers of DIAL in relation to the Delhi airports are traceable to Section 12A of the AAI Act." It is clear that without Central Government's permission, AAI could not have delegated any power to DIAL. In other words, the functioning of DIAL at the Delhi airports itself was fully dependent on the approval of the Central Government. In other words, DIAL could not have received its contract with AAI without the Central Government's approval. That being the case, by a plain reading of the phrase it seems that "DIAL functions under the authority of the Central Government.” (Page: 151, Para: 50)


“DIAL expressly assumed the "rights and obligations associated with the operation and management of the airport" through OMDA. While Section 12A of the AAI Act only notes that the "powers and functions" of AAI will be transferred to its lessors, it is "inconceivable that by virtue of Section 12A the powers and functions of AAI will stand transferred and not the corresponding obligations." If it was the "obligation" of AAI to follow valid directions of the Central Government by virtue of its status as an enumerated industry, and if DIAL has admittedly assumed those same obligations through OMDA, then DIAL is presumably also obligated to follow such directions. Again, a contrary interpretation would allow AAI to circumvent the Central Government's exercise of authority over its work merely by contracting it out to third parties. It is abundantly clear that the Central Government is the appropriate government qua DIAL and consequently the said Notification of 26th July, 2004 is equally applicable to DIAL.”

3. The Labour Court though constituted by the State Government has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute of subsistence allowance raised by a workman who is though governed by Appropriate Government central


The workman who is governed by the Appropriate Government, Central, has invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court constituted by the State Government for adjudication of the dispute of „subsistence allowance‟ by wrongly labeling the application u/s. 33C(2) instead of Sec.10A(2) of Standing Order. The employer resisted the application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the court has not been specified by the Central Government. The Labour Court and Division Bench held that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction though constituted by State Government no matter not specified by Central Government. The Supreme Court concurring with the decision held that in Sec. 10A(2) of Standing Order there is no requirement of specification of Appropriate Government. Labour Court under Industrial Disputes Act within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the establishment is situated has jurisdiction to decide dispute of subsistence allowance. The Labour Court though constituted by the State Government has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute of subsistence allowance raised by a workman who is though governed by Appropriate Government central‟.

Vijaya Bank v. Shyamal Kumar Lodh, 2010

“From a plain reading of the Sec. 10A(2) of the aforesaid Act it is evident that the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the establishment is situated, has jurisdiction to decide any dispute regarding subsistence allowance. Here in the present case undisputedly dispute pertains to subsistence allowance and the Labour Court where the workman had brought the action has been constituted u/s. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and further the appellant bank is situated within the local limits of its jurisdiction. The workman had, though, chosen to file application u/s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act but that in our opinion shall not denude jurisdiction to the Labour Court, if it otherwise possesses jurisdiction. Incorrect label of the application and mentioning wrong provision neither confers jurisdiction nor denudes the Court of its jurisdiction. Relief sought for, if falls within the jurisdiction of the Court, it can not be thrown out on the ground of its erroneous label or wrong mentioning of provision. In the present case the Labour Court, Dibrugarh satisfies all the requirements to decide the dispute raised by the employee before it.” (Page: 190, Para: 16)

4 For National Research Center

The question is whether the Appropriate Government to National Research Center for Citrus, a body under the administrative and financial control of ICAR is State or Central Government. The workmen had filed a complaint under MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 which was rejected both by Labour and Industrial Court for want of jurisdiction. However the Single Judge reversed the decisions and held that the Appropriate Government is State Government. Setting aside that order the Division Bench upheld the orders of Labour and Industrial Courts by looking into the intent and purport of the Rules of ICAR wherein it was clear that the Central Government exercised sufficient authority and power in the actual functioning of ICAR. The composition, the limitations on exercise of the power and restriction on the exercise of financial powers, and the dynamics of the society shows that it functions under the guidelines and directions imposed and issued by the Government of India and hence it functions under the authority of the Central Government. The ICAR has no independent existence than that of its members who are only governmental functionaries or their nominees, controlled and guided by the Central Government. Hence it is clear that the forums under MRTU have no jurisdiction.

Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), New Delhi, through its Secretary& Anr. v. Duryodhan Hiraman Ingole, Nagpur & Ors., 2011
“..........Having regard to the..........the Government of India.” (Page: 416, Para: 8)
“Thus, all these factors..........the Government of India.” (Page: 417, Para: 9)

5 For Co-op Bank

So far as Valsad District Co-op.Bank is concerned, the Appropriate Government is State Government while so holding the Single Judge and Division Bench relied on the judgment of Bharat Co-op. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Co-op. Bank Employees Union, 2007 II LLJ 825 (SC) thereby settling the dispute as to Appropriate Government to these categories of banks are concerned.

Valsad District Co-operative Bank Ltd. through Manager v. Valsad District Co-operative Bank Employees Union, 2010 

“..........In any case..........Single Judge.” (Page: 168, Para: 5)

6 For Transport company

The transport company was a contractor of India Cement Factory supplying lime stones from limestone query. The same was registered as a transport company with the State Government and yet its workers raised an Industrial Dispute with the Central Government Industrial Tribunal apprehending closure of the transport company. But the employer contested the same stating that the CGIT has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter as the Appropriate Government for the employer is State Government. So far as India Cement Factory for which the Central Government is the Appropriate Government is concerned, the employees of Transport Company and the India Cement Factory have no employer employee relationship. The Single Judge and Division Bench upheld the contents of the employer of Transport Company and directed the workmen to approach appropriate forum if they so choose for adjudication of their dispute.

India Cements Employees Union, Tirunelveli v. Secretary to Government, Ministry of Labour Govt. of India, Delhi & Ors., 2010
“S. Jayaram..........Central Government.” (Page: 100, Para: 10)
“This observation..........the matter.” (Page: 100, Para: 11)

7 For Dock Worker

The Appropriate Government for referring to the dispute, arising out of termination of the services of a dock clerk attached to the business of a clearing and forwarding agent of a major dock, is Central Government because the nature of the dispute is such as to bear a reasonable and rational relationship to a major port. Such nexus bring the dispute within the ambit of Sec. 2(a)(i) and not 2(a)(ii) if the Act.
M/s. Sylvester & Co. v. Their Workman through Transport & Dock Workers' Union & Anr., 2008
“The Section..........major port.” (Page: 551, Para: 7)

8 For Multi-State Co-operative Bank

The Appropriate Government for Multi-State Co-operative Bank is State Government because the definition of the “Banking Company” in Clause (bb) of Sec. 2 of the Act being exhaustive, the Central Government is Appropriate Government only with reference to that definition as held in the case of Bharat Co-operative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd., (2007 (114) FLR 155 (SC)). Therefore the reference made by the Central Government was held bad in law. Secondly the onus to prove that they had worked for 240 days preceding the complaint is on the workmen. Thirdly, the claim for back wages depends on proof that the workmen had no source of income during the period of termination. Hence the award in favour of workmen was set aside.
The Saraswat Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. The Saraswat Co-op. Bank Employees Union & Ors., 2011
“The learned counsel..........to be set aside.” (Page: 27, Para: 11)
“In the result..........july, 1998.” (Page: 32, Para: 22)

9 For Major Port

The Sec. 2(a) of the Act was amended by notification dated 15.9.2010 whereby Central Government is the Appropriate Government if the major Port, any company in which not less than 51% of the paid of share capital is held by the Central Government. The question is whether the amendment applies to a company in which the holding company in which the Central Government is having 59.67% of shares and the holding company is having 61.08% shares in the company against which the dispute is raised. The High Court held that in such cases the new definition is not attracted and for such companies the State Government is competent to make a reference. In this case, majority shares of Management, Balmer Lawrie and Co.Ltd. is held not by the Central Government but by Balmer Lawrie Investment Ltd in which Government of India is holding 59.67 % shares
.
Management, Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd., Chennai v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 2011
“The said amendment was..........the Appropriate Government.” (Page: 439, Para: 8)

10 For Hindustan Cables Ltd

Employer, Hindustan Cables Ltd. being a Government of India undertaking which is being run for and on behalf of the Central Government, the Appropriate Government is Central Government. Hence the State Government cannot make a reference to an industrial dispute. Hence the State Government could not have referred to a matter with regard to a Central Government undertaking. The Industrial Disputes Act empowers the Central Government to refer labour disputes u/s. 10 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act to the preceding officer appointed by the Central Government. Petition of the employer was allowed and reference and award of the labour court was quashed and set aside.

Hindustan Cables Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, (I) U.P. Allahabad & Ors., 2010 II LLJ 137 (All.HC) CMWP 29283 of 2007 dt. 12-1-2009

“It is not..........the aforesaid decision.” (Page: 138, Para: 4)


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