Himalaya Drug Co. Makali vs II Additional Labour Court
Karnataka High Court
Himalaya Drug Co. Makali vs Ii Additional Labour Court, ... on 3 January, 1986
Equivalent citations: 1986 (52) FLR 704, ILR 1986 KAR 1553, (1986) IILLJ 45 Kant
Bench: P Bopanna
JUDGMENT
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. The Labour Court rejected the case of the petitioner on the ground that a specific plea was not taken in the statement of objections filed by it on the maintainability of the claim for bonus by respondents Nos. 2 to 16 (workmen). The petitioner has taken a specific contention in paragraph 5 of the statement of objections as follows :
"The applicants are not entitled to any bonus as they were dismissed for serious act of misconduct involving moral turpitude, violent and destructive acts causing loss and damage to the respondent. The applicants are disqualified from claiming bonus. Thereby, the applicants have forfeited their claims for bonus as per the provisions of law."
Though the petitioner had not mentioned the specific section under which it was resisting the claim for bonus, the pleadings in paragraph 5 of the statement of objections leave no doubt that it was with reference to S. 9 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (the Act). C
3. Even then, the point for consideration would be whether, under S. 9 of the Act, it was open to the petitioner-management to forfeit the amount of bonus to the workmen on the ground that they were dismissed from service for serious acts of misconduct involving moral turpitude, etc., as pleaded in paragraph 5 of the objection statement. It is not in dispute that these workmen were dismissed from service of the petitioner without holding an enquiry obviously because the petitioner was of the view that it was not feasible to hold an enquiry into the serious acts of misconduct committed by the workmen and, therefore, it had preferred to prove the case against the workmen by adducing fresh evidence before the Labour Court. In the circumstances, this Court has to proceed on the basis that the acts alleged aginst the workmen which resulted in their dismissal were subject to proof and a finding of the Labour Court thereon that the workmen deserved the extreme penalty of dismissal for the alleged misconduct committed by them. But that would not in any way preclude this Court from interpreting the provisions of S. 9 of the Act since the question relating to bonus will come up for consideration before the Labour Court or before the management immediately after an award is made by the Labour Court one way or the other. If the workmen are not found guilty of the alleged misconduct, they will automatically be entitled to bonus which was due to them in the accounting year in which the alleged misconduct was committee. If they are found guilty of the misconduct alleged against them and if the order of dismissal made by the petitioner-management is sustained by the Labour Court, the point for consideration would be whether the management could forfeit only the amount of bonus which became due to the workmen during the accounting year in which the alleged misconduct was committed or is it open to the management to withhold the aggregate of the bonus not paid to the workmen even for the years preceding the accounting year. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Madras High Court reported in Wheel & Rim Company of India Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu, [1977-II L.L.J. 299]. The Learned Judge held that on the plain language of S. 9 of the Act, which is in contra-distinction to the language in S. 18 of the Act, the workmen are liable to lose their claim for the aggregate amount of bonus due to them if they are dismissed from service for any misconduct mentioned in S. 9 of the Act. The reasoning of the learned Judge in his elaborate judgment is found in the paragraph of the judgment at 306. They are :
"i. Use of the expression 'notwithstanding anything contained in this Act', in S. 9 ii. Use of the expression 'disqualified from receiving bonus under this Act.' iii. Absence of any reference to any particular accounting year in vivid contrast with the use of clear expression in S. 18 providing for deduction of the amount of the loss caused to the employer by the misconduct of the employee from out of the bonus payable to the employee in the particular accounting year only.
iv. Possibility of the criminal acts, the commission of which disqualifies, being found to have been committed in the course of more than one accounting year; and v. The nature of the acts of misconduct enumerated in S. 9 being serious and opposed to the principle of sharing in the prosperity of the management which is one of the fundamental concepts of bonus."
The learned Judge also referred to the relevant paragraphs of the report of the Bonus Commission, 1964, to fortify his decision to adopt the literal construction of the provisions of S. 9 of the Act.
4. Both the learned counsel for the parties submitted that there was no other decision on this point excepting the above decision of the Madras High Court. Mr. Murthy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously contended that the decision of the Madras High Court correctly lays down the law and he has commended that decision for my acceptance.
5. At the outset I may observe that the judgment of the Madras High Court rested on the three provisions of the Act, viz., Ss. 8, 9 and 18. S. 8 relates to the eligibility for bonus, i.e., every employee shall be entitled to be paid by his employer in an accounting year, bonus, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, provided he has worked in the establishment for not less than thirty working days in that year. The eligibility for the claim of bonus due to him in an accounting year is that he should have worked not less than 30 days in that year. S. 9 relates to disqualification for bonus in case of workmen who are dismissed from service for certain gross misconduct more particularly enumerated in that section. It reads as under :
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, an employee shall be disqualified from receiving bonus under this Act, if he is dismissed from service for :
(a) fraud; or
(b) riotous or violent behaviour while on the premises of the establishment; or (c) theft, misappropriation or sabotage of any property of the establishment".
Section 18 is another clause which empowers the management to deduct certain amounts from bonus payable under the Act. It reads as under :
"Where in any accounting year an employee is found guilty of misconduct causing financial loss to the employer, then, it shall be lawful for the employer to deduct the amount of loss from the amount of bonus payable by him to the employee under this Act in respect of that accounting year only and the employee shall be entitled to receive the balance, if any".
On the plain language of S. 18, it is clear that the employer has a right to deduct the bonus due to the employee in any accounting year if he is found guilty of the misconduct causing financial loss in that accounting year. That means to say, if the financial loss is more than the bonus due to the employee, the employer would be permitted to deduct the amount equivalent to the bonus payable to the employee during the accounting year. The Madras High Court, on an examination of these three provisions relating to eligibility for bonus, disqualification for payment of bonus and right to deduct the bonus amount for causing financial loss to the employee, came to the conclusion that the words 'in any accounting year' are not found in S. 9, and, therefore, the intention of the legislature was very clear, in that it wanted to take a very serious view of the misconduct committed by the workmen which would ordinarily result in his dismissal. Accordingly, it empowered the employer to forfeit the entire amount of bonus which would have become due to the employee notwithstanding the fact that such amount did not become due to him in the accounting year in which the misconduct was committed but in the year or years preceding it.
6. A literal interpretation of S. 9 would definitely support the case of the petitioner and that was the view taken by the learned Judge of the Madras High Court. But, in my view, a mere examination of these three provisions to which I have adverted would not provide a proper clue to the interpretation of S.9. It is well-settled that while interpreting the provisions of a beneficial piece of legislation, the entire scheme and object of the Act should be taken into consideration, that is to say, a schematic interpretation of the Act would be a better guide for interpreting the beneficial provisions of the Acts like the Payment of Bonus Act or the Industrial Disputes Act or for that matter any other Act pertaining to social legislation. It is an undeniable fact that the concept of bonus has undergone considerable change. Now it has become a statutory right and no more a bounty of the management for the good work turned out by the workmen during an accounting year. The workmen can claim minimum bonus as a matter of right irrespective of the fact that the management makes profits or not and they can claim the maximum bonus of 20 per cent., if they make out a case in terms of Schedules I, II and III of the Act. When such is the right conferred on the workmen for minimum and maximum bonus, can that right be taken away all because the workmen happen to commit some grave misconduct during a particular accounting year which had resulted in their dismissal ? It is understandable that bonus due in a particular accounting year could be withheld if the workman is dismissed from service for the misconduct proved against him during that accounting year. But S.9 does not say so. Therefore, this Court has to gather the intention of Parliament from the words of the statute. If the scheme of the Act of Payment of bonus is taken into consideration, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner that the workman will forfeit the amount of bonus due including the amounts which became due to him during the year or years preceding the accounting year in question. The scheme of the Act for payment of bonus could be discerned by properly appreciating the words 'accounting year' which are found in the various provisions of the Act. S. 2(1) defines 'accounting year' thus :
"(i) in relation to a corporation, the year ending on the day on which books and accounts of the corporation are to be closed and balanced;
(ii) in relation to a company, the period in respect of which any profit and loss account of the company laid before it in annual general meeting is made up, whether that period is a year or not;
(iii) in any other case -
(a) the year commencing on the 1st day of April; or
(b) if the accounts of an establishment maintained by the employer thereof are closed and balanced on any day other than the 31st day of March, then, at the option of the employer, the year ending on the day on which its accounts are so closed and balanced :
Provided that an option once exercised by the employer under paragraph (b) of this sub-clause shall not again be exercised except with the previous permission in writing of the prescribed authority and upon such conditions as that authority may think fit."
7. It is not in dispute that bonus will be payable to the workman on the basis of the computation as prescribed in Schedules I, II and III, as the case may be, and by working out the allocable surplus and the available surplus as defined in the Act. "Allocable surplus" means :
"(a) in relation to an employer, being a company (other than a banking company) which has not made the arrangements prescribed under the Income-tax Act for the declaration and payment within India of the dividends payable out of its profits in accordance with the provisions of S. 194 of that Act, sixty-seven per cent., of the available surplus in an accounting year;
(b) in any other case, sixty per cent., of such available surplus... ". "Available surplus" means the available surplus computed under S. 5 of the Act. S. 5 of the Act reads as under :
"The available surplus in respect of any accounting year shall be the gross profits for that year after deducting therefrom the sums referred to in S. 6. .............. ".
I have already referred to Ss. 8 and 9 of the Act. S. 10 of the Act which prescribes the payment of minimum bonus is also with reference to the accounting year, S. 11 of the Act which deals with the payment of maximum bonus is also with reference to the accounting year. Likewise, computation of the number of working days which would entitle the workmen to claim bonus is also with reference to the accounting year. The set-off and set-on provisions relating to allocable surplus are also with reference to the accounting year. Likewise, the provisions regarding infancy protection under S. 16 are also with reference to the fifth to eighth accounting years. S. 17 of the Act requires to be noticed in detail in order to ascertain the scheme and object of the Act. It reads as under :
"Where in any accounting year -
(a) an employer has paid any puja bonus or other customary bonus to an employee, or
(b) an employer has paid a part of the bonus payable under this Act to an employee before the date on which such bonus becomes payable, then, the employer shall be entitled to deduct the amount of bonus so paid from the amount of bonus payable by him to the employee under this Act in respect of that accounting year and the employee shall be entitled to receive only the balance."
Under this provision, an employee is not precluded from claiming puja bonus and customary bonus if he has a right to do so and if such bonus is paid, the employer has the right to adjust that amount as against the bonus due to the employee in that accounting year under the Act. Supposing puja or customary bonus is paid to the employee before he is found guilty of the act of misconduct, it will not be open to the employer to recover that amount on the ground that he had a right of adjustment under S. 17 because the disqualification in S. 9 applies to bonus receivable under the Act and not to puja or customary bonus. I have already referred to S. 18 and the implication of that section. It only permits the employer to make good financial loss caused to it by the employee up to the extent of bonus payable to the employee during the accounting year in question. S. 19 prescribes the time-limit for payment of bonus and that time-limit is within a period of 8 months from the close of the accounting year where there is no dispute regarding bonus. If there is a dispute before any authority under S. 22, then within one month from the date on which the award becomes unforceable or the settlement comes into operation in respect of such dispute. S. 31A is a special provision with respect to payment of bonus linked with production or productivity. The relevant provisions of S. 31A read as under :
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act -
(i) where an agreement or a settlement has been entered into by the employees with their employer before the commencement of the Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Act, 1976, or
(ii) where the employees enter into any agreement or settlement with their employer after such commencement, for payment of an annual bonus linked with production or productivity in lieu of bonus based on profits payable under this Act, then, such employees shall be entitled to receive bonus due to them under such agreement or settlement, as the case may be...."
It should be noticed that the settlement contemplated in S. 31A for bonus linked with production or productivity does not say that it should be a settlement in a particular accounting year. What all it provides for is payment of annual bonus linked with production and productivity. I have referred to the omission of the words "accounting year" in S. 31A in order to bring out the fallacy of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the omission of the words "accounting year" in S. 9 would make all the difference for its correct interpretation. The opening words of S. 31A make it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, it is open to the parties to have a settlement for payment of bonus linked with production and productivity. That means to say that notwithstanding the provisions for profit sharing bonus under the Act and the other provisions which empower the workmen to claim minimum and maximum bonus and also the provisions disqualifying the workmen from claiming bonus under the Act or proportionate payment of bonus (see section 8), the management and the workmen could enter into a settlement for bonus linked with production and productivity in lieu of profit sharing bonus. The second proviso to S. 31A makes it clear that annual bonus linked with production and productivity should not exceed 20 per cent. of the salary or wage earned during the relevant accounting year. This bonus is payable to the workmen even if they incur the disqualification under S. 9 or entitled to proportionate bonus under S. 8.
8. This being the scheme of the Act, it is an undeniable fact that the claim for bonus is related to the profits in a particular accounting year and not related to the number of years of service put in by the workman or to the individual effort put in by the workman or to the number of days worked by them.
9. If this scheme is kept in view, there could be no difficulty in properly construing the provisions of S. 9 of the Act. Ordinarily, the employee could be dismissed only once during the entire tenure of service under the employer. If so dismissed his claim for bonus will come up for consideration. What S. 9 says is that if he is dismissed for acts of misconduct mentioned in S. 9, he will be disqualified from claiming bonus. Supposing there is a dispute regarding bonus for three consecutive accounting years and that dispute is pending under S. 22 of the Act and the workman is dismissed for misconduct during the third accounting year, it is not proper to extend the scope of S. 9 in that case to the earlier two accounting years in which the workman had a clean record of service and during which period he did not incur any disqualification as provided under S. 9 of the Act. Alternatively, the workman commits misconduct during the accounting year 1983-84. He is not dismissed during that year because of the pendency of the enquiry proceedings. He continues to work during the accounting year 1984-85 and is dismissed at the end of that accounting year. Why should he lose the bonus for the accounting year 1984-85 ? Therefore, the omission of the words "accounting year" in S. 9 should not be construed to mean that the legislature had the intention of disqualifying the workman from claiming bonus for all the previous year or years preceding the accounting year in question or the year/years succeeding the accounting year. If the interpretation sought to be put by the learned counsel for the petitioner in S. 9 is accepted, S. 17 of the Act makes an invidious distinction between puja bonus and customary bonus paid before the employee commits misconduct in any particular accounting year and bonus which becomes due to him in that year. Therefore, a harmonious construction should be put on S. 9 which should not conflict with the other beneficial provisions of the Act.
10. A similar point under the Industrial Disputes Act on the interpretation of S. 10(8) as amended by Act 46 of 1982 came up for consideration in W.P. No. 22061 of 1981 decided on 15th/18th October, 1985, (1986) 68 FJR 18. It was argued by the counsel for the management in that case that a literal construction should be put on the amended provision of S. 10(8) of the Industrial Disputes Act and thus construed the proceeding before a conciliation officer and the Government would come to an end on the death of the workman. Though S. 10(8) of the Industrial Disputes Act specifically provided for the continuation of the proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute after the death of a workman, this Court adopting the schematic interpretation of the Industrial Disputes Act upheld the plea of the workmen that it was permissible for the legal representatives to continue the proceedings before the conciliation officer and the Government notwithstanding the death of the workman during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings or the proceedings before the Government. I referred to the judgment of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates and observed as follows : (pp. 25, 26, 27, 28 of 68 FJR) :
"The intention of the legislature will have to be ascertained from the language of the statute, the scheme and the object sought to be achieved by the statute. The Supreme Court had adopted the rule of interpretation adopted by Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 K.B. 481, in the interpretation of taxing statutes (see Entry Tax case - ) in favour of the State though at one time, the judicial opinion was that taxing statutes must be construed strictly against the State. Therefore, the adoption of the same rule of interpretation in the case cannot be faulted. The judicial opinion even in England is also veering round towards liberal interpretation of statutes as observed by Lord Diplock in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd., [1971] A.C. 850. In that case the House of Lords was interpreting the provisions of the rent control statute enacted for the benefit of the tenant. Lord Diplock observed :
This can be done only by the purposive approach, viz., imputing to Parliament an intention not to impose a prohibition inconsistent with the objects which the statute was designed to achieve, though the draftsman has omitted to incorporate in express words any reference to that intention."
11. This rule of interpretation was considered by the House of Lords while dealing with the provisions of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974 (see Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R. 231). I am relying on this case in preference to various other decisions on the point since this is a decision which relates to industrial relations arising under the Trade Union & Labour Relations Act. In that case it was the employer who raised the plea that the literal meaning of the statute would result in obvious anomalies and therefore the Court should depart from the literal construction of the statute by not giving effect to the plain language of the statute. That plea was rejected by the House of Lords. But Viscount Dilhorne observed :
'It is now fashionable to talk of a purposive construction of a statute, but it has been recognised since the 17th century that it is the task of the judiciary in interpreting an Act to seek to interpret it 'according to the intent of them that made it'.' He further observed that :
'If it were the case that it appeared that an Act might have been better drafted, or that amendment to it might be less productive of anomalies, it is not open to the Court to remedy the defect. That must be left to the Legislature.' He also referred to the observations of Lord Justice Stephenson of the Court of Appeal from which that case was taken to the House of Lords. What the Law Lord observed is as follows (p. 243 of [1978] 1 W.L.R.) :
'It is a wrong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to do...... we are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.' Lord Scarman, in the very same judgment, observed as follows :
'If the words used by Parliament are plain, there is no room for the 'anomalies' test, unless the consequences are so absurd that, without going outside the statute, one can see that Parliament must have made a drafting mistake. If words 'have been inadvertently used', it is legitimate for the Court to substitute what is apt to avoid the intention of the legislature being defeated.... This is an acceptable exception to the general rule that plain language excludes a consideration of anomalies, i.e., mischievous or absurd consequences. If a study of the statute as a whole leads inexorably to the conclusion that Parliament has erred in its choice of words, e.g., used "and" when "or" was clearly intended, the Courts can, and must, eliminate the error by interpretation. But mere "manifest absurdity" is not enough : it must be an error (of commission or omission) which in its context defeats the intention of the Act.' The judgment of Lord Simon of Glaisdale should also be noticed since he has very succinctly and lucidly given the instances where the Court should go by the literal words and where the Court should go by the intention of the statute. He observed as under (p. 236 of [1978] 1 W.L.R.) :
'It is idle to debate whether, in so acting, the Court is making law. As has been cogently observed, it depends on what you mean by "make" and "law" in this context. What is incontenstible is that the Court is a mediating influence between the executive and the Legislature, on the one hand, and the citizen on the other. Nevertheless, it is essential to the proper judicial function in the Constitution to bear in mind : (1) modern legislation is a difficult and complicated process, in which, even before a bill is introduced in a House of Parliament, successive drafts are considered and their possible repercussions on all envisageable situations are weighed by people bringing to bear a very wide range of experience : the judge cannot match such experience or envisage all such repercussions, either by training or by specific forensic aid; (2) the bill is liable to be modified in a Parliament dominated by a House of Commons whose members are answerable to the citizens who will be affected by the legislation : an English judge is not so answerable; (3) in a society living under the rule of law citizens are entitled to regulate their conduct according to what a statute has said, rather than by what it was meant to say or by what it would have otherwise said if a newly considered situation had been envisaged; (4) a stark contradistinction between the letter and the spirit of the law may be very well in the sphere of ethics, but in the forensic process St. John is a safer guide than St. Paul, the logos being the informing spirit; and it should be left to peoples' courts in totalitarian regimes to stretch the law to meet the forensic situation in response to a gut reaction; (5) Parliament may well be prepared to tolerate some anomaly in the interest of an overriding objective; (6) what strikes the lawyer as an injustice may well have seemed to the Legislature as no more than the correction of a now unjustifiable privilege or as a particular misfortune necessarily or acceptably involved in the vindication of some supervening general social benefit; (7) the parliamentary draftsman knows what objective the legislative promoter wishes to attain, and he will normally and desirably try to achieve that objective by using language of the appropriate register in its natural, ordinary and primary sense : to reject such an approach on the grounds that it gives rise to an anomaly is liable to encourage complication and anfractuosity in drafting; (8) Parliament is nowadays in continuous session, so that an unlooked for an unsupportable injustice or anomaly can be readily rectified by legislation; this is far preferable to judicial contortion of the law to meet apparently hard cases with the result that ordinary citizens and their advisers hardly know where they stand.
12. All this is not to advocate judicial supineness : it is merely respectfully to commend a self-knowledge of judicial limitations, both personal and constitutional. To apply it to the argument on behalf of the appellant based on anomaly, a Court would only be justified in departing from the plain words of the statute were it satisfied that : (1) there is clear and gross balance of anomaly : (2) Parliament, the legislative promoters and the draftsman could not have envisaged such anomaly, could not have been prepared to accept it in the interest of a supervening legislative objective : (3) the anomaly can be obviated without detriment to such legislative objective : (4) the language of the statute is susceptible of the modification required to obviate the anomaly'."
13. However, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of S. 31A would not be a proper guidance for the interpretation of S. 9 of the Act. According to him, the non-obstante clause in S. 9 overrides the non-obstante clause in S. 31A of the Act and, therefore, in the absence of the words "accounting year", in S. 9, the intention of the Legislature is very clear, that is, to confer a right on the employer to forfeit the entire amount of bonus due to the workman irrespective of the fact that the order of dismissal was passed against him in the relevant accounting year or not. In my view, if full effect has to be given to the non-obstante clause in S. 9 of the Act, there is no good reason for not giving the same effect to the non-obstante clause in S. 31A of the Act. The two non obstante clauses in S. 9 and 31A of the Act will have to be interpreted with reference to the object and purpose of the Act under consideration since these two non-obstante clause operate in the same field overriding anything contained in the Act. The object and purpose of the Act is to confer a statutory right on the employees for minimum and maximum bonus under the Act and, therefore, the non-obstante clause in S. 9 should not be given full effect so as to override the non-obstante clause in S. 31A of the Act which will result in an interpretation that is contrary to the object and purpose of the Act. As observed by the Supreme Court in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, , in a slightly different context, statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol and cases of conflict had to be decided with reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration. The interpretation put by me on S. 9 of the Act does not in any way offend the scheme, purpose or object of the Act. No anomaly or injustice would result from putting that construction, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the workmen. If full effect is given to the non-obstante clause in S. 31A of the Act, it will not lead to any anomalous results as contended by the management. The object of S. 31A is to enable the parties to enter into a collective bargaining settlement. It is not an individual agreement or settlement as contemplated in the Law of Contracts but as contemplated under S. 12(3) or 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. If the object of collective bargaining is kept in view, the fact that an individual workman commits misconduct or a small group of men commit misconduct in an accounting year is not relevant or of no consequence to their claim of bonus linked with production or productivity under a settlement between the parties for payment of annual bonus. If that is understood, there won't be any difficulty in construing S. 9 of the Act harmoniously with the other provisions of the Act. Additionally, S. 31A was inserted by Act 23 of 1976 with effect from 25th September, 1975 and, therefore, the Legislature must be deemed to have in view the non-obstante clause in S. 9. If that be so, the later non-obstante clause overrides the earlier clause in S. 9. Thus construed, it is clear that the right of the management to forfeit bonus on the ground that the workman was dismissed from service for misconduct, more particularly mentioned in S. 9 of the Act, would be only with reference to the accounting year in which the said act of misconduct was committed and not with reference to any year or years preceding or succeeding the accounting year in question.
14. Even the recommendations of the Bonus Commission which were quoted by the Madras High Court do not throw much light on the proper interpretation of S. 9. The Bonus Commission report on this point is found at para 19, 15. It reads as under :
"The next question for consideration is whether a dismissed employee should be eligible for bonus payment. There is nothing anomalous in continuing stoppage with dismissal - because such cases warrant severity in order to act as a deterrent. After all, bonus can only be shared by those workers who promote the stability and well-being of the industry and not those who positively display disruptive tendencies. Bonus certainly carries with it the obligation of good behaviour which helps sustain the industry."
It is not possible to come to the conclusion from this report that the Bonus Commission had intended to disqualify the workmen from claiming any bonus due to them on account of the misconduct committed by them during any particular accounting year.
15. It is not in dispute that the claim for bonus by the workmen related to the accounting year ended, on 31st March, 1980. They were dismissed for the alleged misconduct in October, 1980, and, therefore, S. 9 of the Act is not applicable to the workmen. Accordingly, the impugned order directing the management to pay bonus for the accounting year ending with 31st March, 1980, does not call for interference.
16. However, it is made clear that if the Labour Court were to record a finding that the workmen were guilty of the misconduct alleged against them it is open to the management to withhold the bonus due for the accounting year commencing from 30th March, 1980.
17. Accordingly this writ petition is dismissed.
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